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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the United Kingdom and those countries that recognise Elizabeth II as their 
Queen,
1
 there are to be found certain fundamental constitutional principles. 
One of these is that much of the legal basis of executive power derives from 
the Crown,
2
 though this has, in the past, often been downplayed for political 
and other reasons. Indeed, in the Commonwealth as a whole, political 
independence has often been equated with the reduction of the role of the 
Crown to a position of subservience to the political executive.
3
 What remains 
important is the position of the Crown as an organising principle of 
government (the framework upon which the structure of government is built
4
), 
as a source of legitimacy, and as a symbol for permanent government. 
Executive power, therefore, remains based on the royal prerogative, and the 
„third source‟ of authority (the legal powers of the legal natural person, as the 
Crown is a corporation aggregate), as well as upon statute law. 
The royal prerogative is the residue of royal power which derives from the 
ancient rights, privileges and powers of the Sovereign, including the 
prerogative of mercy, political prerogatives such as declaring war or peace, 
and financial prerogatives such as bona vacantia. Within the scope of the 
                                                   
*
Aberystwyth University. 
1  These countries include Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Canada, Grenada, Jamaica, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, 
and the United Kingdom. 
2  B V Harris “The „Third Source‟ of Authority for Government Action” (1992) 108 
Law Quarterly Review 626. For a definition of the Crown, see Janine Hayward “In 
Search of a Treaty Partner: Who, or What, is „The Crown?‟” (1995) Victoria 
University of Wellington PhD thesis. 
3  David E Smith “Bagehot, the Crown, and the Canadian Constitution” (1995) 28 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 623-624.  
4
  Recent examples include Crown Health Enterprises. 
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royal prerogative, the Sovereign once had a comparatively free hand to act.
5
 
Yet even these powers are now limited by the legal concept of convention,
6
 
and, more recently, by the principles of administrative law.
7
 The Sovereign 
enjoys certain powers, but these are to be exercised (for the most part) by 
Ministers responsible to Parliament, rather than by the Sovereign personally, 
without, however, prior authorisation – or subsequent validation – by 
Parliament. 
The idea that the prerogative is an uncomfortable fit with the supremacy of 
Parliament, and the rule of law,
8
 weakens its position (as does other factors), 
for it was seen as something of an enigma, or even a black hole. The very 
survival of the prerogative is now questioned in some quarters, though 
whether the curtailment of the prerogative results in its eventual extinction is a 
moot question – as is the question of whether this would be a desirable 
outcome. 
 
CURTAILMENT OF THE PREROGATIVE 
 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon, in writing on the place and nature of the Crown, has 
built upon the views of Sir Owen Dixon, who saw the evolution of 
constitutional law, both in the United Kingdom, and in the overseas realms of 
the Crown, as the product of the interplay between three potentially 
conflicting conceptions. These were the supremacy of the law, the supremacy 
of the Crown, and the supremacy of Parliament.
9
 This interplay has produced 
the present constitutional structure, whose defining aspects are identified, 
                                                   
5
  The seventeenth century view was that the courts would not enquire into the manner 
of use of an admitted prerogative ─ at any rate if the holder was not shown to be 
acting in bad faith; Darnel’s Case (“the Case of the Five Knights”) (1627) 3 State Tr 
1; reaffirmed by Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] 3 WLR 694. 
6  Conventions are similar to legal rules, but they cannot be enforced by the courts; 
Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645 (PC); NO 1968 (2) SA 284; 
Adesebenro v Akintola [1963] AC 614, 630. They are rules of political practice which 
are regarded as binding by those to whom they apply. Laws are enforceable by the 
courts, conventions are not; Colin Munro “Laws and Conventions Distinguished” 
(1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review 218.  
7
  See the Operation Dismantle Case (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 481 (SCC); (1983) 3 D.L.R. 
(4th) 193 (FCA); Clive Walker “Review of the Prerogative” (1987) Public Law 62. 
8
  Thomas Poole “United Kingdom: The Royal Prerogative” (2010) 8(1) ICON 146-
155 at 147. 
9  “The Law and the Constitution” (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 590; Lord Cooke 
of Thorndon “The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown” in Philip Joseph Essays 
on the Constitution (1995) pp 28-40. 
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though perhaps misunderstood, by Montesquieu.
10
 This is the origin and 
antecedent of both the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
The supremacy of the law is an idea that we owe to the early Middle 
Ages.
11
 There was then no concept of the sovereign state, at least in part 
because everyone had a different lord to whom they owed allegiance.
12
 To 
many in the seventeenth century the law was the true sovereign. With the 
Reformation a true theory of sovereignty became possible, because of the vast 
increase in the powers and activity of the legislature. Judges, as professors of 
the common law, claimed for it supreme authority. Had this been admitted 
they would have been the ultimate authority in the state,
13
 as perhaps they are 
today in the United States of America, where the separation of powers, and an 
entrenched constitution, ensure a major constitutional role for the judiciary. 
Oresme argues that legislative power is vested in the people as a whole, 
since they alone can judge the common good.
14
 This view was roughly 
compatible with the English constitutional position in the latter Middle Ages, 
when Parliament was regarded as the indispensable forum for the production 
of statute law.
15
 Fortescue arrived at a similar conclusion, though by a very 
different route. This was a result of his experience in the English law courts, 
where he concluded that: 
 
“The statutes of England ... are made, not only by the Prince‟s will, 
but also by the assent of whole realm, so they cannot be injurious to 
the people nor fail to secure their advantage.”16 
                                                   
10  Charles de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu “The Spirit of the Laws” in A Lijphart, 
(ed) Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (1992), 48-51. 
11  In England, Reginald Pecock and John Fortescue, and on the Continent, Pierre 
D‟Ailly, Nicholas of Cusa; Reginald Pecock Donet (1921) p 76; Sir John Fortescue In 
Praise of the Laws of England (De Laudibus Legum Angliæ) S B Chrimes (ed) 
(1942), c 36 p 87; Sir Robert Carlyle and AJ Carlyle A History of Mediaeval Political 
Theory in the West (1903-36), vol VI pp 138 and p 141. 
12 Frederic Maitland and Sir Frederick Pollock History of English Law Before the 
Times of Edward I (2nd edn 1895), vol 1 p 182. 
13  J N Figgis The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings (1914) p 230. 
14  Nicole Oresme Le Livres de Politiques d’Aristotle A D Menut (ed) (1970) 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 137-138. 
15  He followed Masilius drawing on Roman law and Aristotelian utility; Jean 
Dunbabin “Government” in J H Burns The Cambridge History of Medieval Political 
Thought c350-c1450 (1988) 507. 
16 Sed non sic Angliae statuta oriri possunt, dum nedum principis voluntate sed et 
totius regni assensu ipsa conduntur, quo populi laesuram illam efficere requeunt vel 
non corum commodum procurare. 
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Fortescue‟s doctrine of English kingship was that it was dominium 
politicum et regale, in contrast with the French dominium regale.
17
  
Continental princes ruled on the basis of the civil law of their stronger 
Roman heritage.
18
 They relied especially on the maxim quod principi placuit 
legis habet vigorem.
19
 English kingship was superior, at least, according to the 
chancellor in Fortescue‟s fictitious disputation which comprises the basis of 
De Laudibus Legum Anglia, because the monarchy was limited by the 
requirement for the assent of Parliament. This was despite the fact that the 
power of kings was everywhere the same, but authority differed because of 
differences in their origins. The laws of England were more venerable, and 
must be deemed to be the best obtainable. This was because they were not 
enacted at the sole behest of the prince, but by the prudence of 300 members 
of Parliament.
20
  
The Reformation Parliament settled the conventional view of the English 
constitution so clearly expounded in Sir Thomas Smith‟s De Republica 
Anglorum (1565) and so hard to find even obscurely stated before 1530s.
21
 As 
a result of the Reformation, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy was 
developed.
22
 But a long fight was waged by King Charles I in defence of his 
prerogative. He was committed to the traditional symbiosis of royal 
prerogative and law rather than any new theory of the state.
23
 
In the course of time the King-in-Parliament, the legislature, became 
supreme over the law. On the Continent the lawyers were antagonistic to 
representative assemblies, and there courts persisted in maintaining the 
predominance of the law over the authority of such assemblies, and so 
                                                                                                                         
– Sir John Fortescue In Praise of the Laws of England (De Laudibus Legum Angliæ) 
ed S B Chrimes (1942), 41. 
17  A limited monarchy, in contrast to an absolute monarchy; Sir John Fortescue  The 
Governance of England notes by Charles Plummer (1979).  
18  The extent to which the common law resisted the reception of Roman law has been 
much disputed, though recent research suggests that the mediæval common law, 
though surviving in an organic sense, actually underwent a substantial reformation in 
the Renaissance period, especially 1490s to 1540s; See the introduction to The 
Reports of Sir John Spelman (1978), vol II Seldon Society vol 94; Sir John Baker  
“English Law and the Renaissance” (1985) Cambridge Law Journal 46.  
19  “What hath pleased the prince has the force of law”. 
20  Sir John Fortescue In Praise of the Laws of England (De Laudibus Legum Angliæ) 
ed SB Chrimes (1942) pp xii-xcviii. 
21  Sir Thomas Smith was a civil lawyer who stood analytically outside the constraints 
of the common law tradition.  
22  Sir Geoffrey Elton  Reform and Reformation, 1509-1558 (1979) pp 199-200. 
23  Kevin Sharpe The Personal Rule of Charles I (1992) p 930. 
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encouraged the growth of absolutism. In England after 1688 no claim was 
made that any rule of the common law was too fundamental to admit of 
change. The course of our constitutional and legal development must have 
been profoundly different had it been otherwise.
24
 It is unclear just when 
parliamentary sovereignty triumphed over the supremacy of the Crown, but 
Parliament took control of the succession in 1689, and asserted it in 1701.
25
 
The law remained supreme over all organs of government as well as people, 
and legislative power (properly expressed) extended over the whole field of 
law.
26
  
The growth of the territorial state brought about the need for one supreme 
authority. As a consequence came a more modern doctrine, a doctrine 
embodying a conception that was widely held. This was the supremacy of the 
Crown as the mystical holder of the sovereignty of the state. Continental 
Europe found in kingship the state‟s source of unity and power. This was to 
remain the lynch-pin of constitutional theory until modern times. 
The majesty of the Holy Roman Emperor had spread all over Europe in the 
thirteenth century. To this doctrine of the divine right of kings, habits of 
thought of the greatest consequences have been traced. These include a deep 
sense of the majesty of the law, and the duty of obedience.
27
 When the 
competing focal points of sovereignty were reconciled in the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the splendour of the Crown remained as 
the legal expression of the sovereignty of the nation. The supremacy of the 
Crown necessarily had to give way under the inexorable advance of the 
supremacy of Parliament – but need not necessarily disappear altogether.  
The aims of the late mediæval and early modern State were negative and 
disciplinary. The extreme emphasis on property rights carried with it an 
emphasis on law – a lawyer‟s rather than a politicians view of government. By 
Fortescue‟s time if not earlier, men felt strong monarchy upheld their rights (a 
mass of technical rules and practices), rather than Parliament.
28
 
                                                   
24  Owen Dixon “The Law and the Constitution” (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 
590. 
25  See, for example, H T Dickinson “The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the „Glorious 
Revolution‟” (1976) 61 History 28-45; H T Dickinson “The Eighteenth-Century 
Debate on the Sovereignty of Parliament” (1976) 26 Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society (5th Series) pp 189-210. 
26  I R Christie Wars and Revolutions (1982) p 21. 
27  J N Figgis The theory of the Divine Right of Kings (1914) p 266. 
28  J R Lander The Limitations of English Monarchy in the Later Middle Ages (1989) 
pp 4-6. 
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De Laudibus Legum Angliæ,
29
 written 1468-71, was one of the first 
coherent exercises in comparative law. It was strongly influenced by the 
French experience of Sir John Fortescue. It had a direct influence on the 
constitutional thinkers of the seventeenth century. Fortescue‟s successors in 
that century argued more precisely that the ancient constitution was Anglo-
Saxon – and the royal prerogative was the right of conquest of William the 
Conqueror.
30
 Fortescue supports the doctrine of constitutional monarchy 
found in St Thomas, but really his support is derived from his own liberal 
sentiments and the experience of England.
31
 
The contention, most clearly expressed by Aquinas, that the King was not 
restrained by law because he controlled coercion, was widely rejected in 
thirteenth century England. Royal jurisdiction depended on co-operation.
32
 In 
both England and France Giles of Rome‟s view that “laws are laid down by 
the prince and established by princely authority”,33 was disputed.34 Bracton 
regarded the magnates as having an essential role in legislation.
35
 
Since 1688 Whigs had insisted that the Sovereign was the servant rather 
than the master of the people, even though the legal forms implied rather more 
than this. But this still left the extent of the active role of the Sovereign 
undecided. For most of the nineteenth century the Whigs assumed a 
“constitutional monarchy” should keep clear of the everyday turmoil of party 
politics (as Bagehot would have it), and this ultimately became, in the 
twentieth century, the official orthodoxy.  
                                                   
29  Sir John Fortescue  In Praise of the laws of England (De Laudibus Legum Angliæ) 
ed SB Chrimes (1942). 
30  Robert Brady argued that Parliament and the common law were not part of an 
ancient and immemorial constitution, but traceable instead to the Conquest and the 
institution of feudalism; J G A Pocock The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law; 
A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (2nd edn, 1987), 
chap 8; Sir James Holt  Magna Carta and Mediæval Government (1985) pp 3-8. 
31  Sir John Fortescue  The Governance of England notes by Charles Plummer (1979) 
p 172. 
32  Jean Dunbabin “Government” in J H Burns The Cambridge History of Medieval 
Political Thought c350-c1450 (1988) pp 505-506. 
33  Giles of Rome De regimine principum (Rome, 1556), I, ii, 10, 1556 fol 44v 
34  Aquinas in particular was not convinced by the Latin tag; St Thomas Aquinas, J 
Gilbey et al (eds) (1964-80), I, IIae, qu 90, art 3. 
35  Henry de Bracton On the Laws and Customs of England (“Henri de Bracton de 
Legibus et Constuetudinibus Angliæ”) G E Woodbine (ed); trans SE Thorne (1968), 
vol. II, p 21. 
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By early in the nineteenth century analytical jurists had made 
parliamentary sovereignty the pivot of the legal system.
36
 The constitution 
depended upon the common law, whose creature it was. The legal expression 
of the power of the state was always through the Crown. But there is nothing 
which transcends the power of an Act of Parliament.
37
 Parliament‟s power to 
suspend the law is absolute. But this position was reached comparatively 
recently, and is not necessarily immutable. The law alone remains permanent 
and ever-present, in a way similar to the later conceptualisation of the Crown. 
It was agreed after 1815 that a Sovereign should be kept out of party 
politics.
38
 Over the course of the nineteenth century the monarchy moved 
from sharing government, to having a share in government, to a largely 
advisory role,
39
 and in the later years of the reign of Victoria the growing 
importance of organised political parties gave her less room to manoeuvre 
than her predecessors.
40
 Responsible government prevailed, but the source for 
executive power remained the royal prerogative, whose basis was the law, not 
parliamentary sanction. 
Since then belief in the supremacy, or sovereignty of Parliament has 
prevailed. But the ancient balance of the constitution depended not merely 
upon democracy. It rested – and today still rests in all those countries with a 
Westminster system of parliamentary democracy and the separation of powers 
imbrued with the principle of the rule of law – upon the supremacy of the 
Crown-in-Parliament, and the survival of a legitimacy which extends well 
beyond mere majoritarian representative democracy.  
The value of the royal prerogative is that it can be exercised free of 
parliamentary control; conversely this is what Harris sees as a weakness and 
would bring to an end. There is no clear argument, however, as to why 
majoritarian representative democracy, operating through Members of 
Parliament, should necessarily provide a greater mandate for executive 
government action than the legitimacy derived from the ancient prerogatives 
of the Crown. Curiously, Harris writes of the “expected role of Parliament as 
                                                   
36  See William Hearn The Government of England: Its Structure and its Development 
(1867), which was a major influence on Dicey. 
37  Owen Dixon “The Law and the Constitution” (1935) 51 Law Quarterly Review 
593-595. Nor will the courts be eager to question the authority of an Act of 
Parliament, a principle cited as early as 1455; P 33 Hen VI 17, 8 at 18 per Fortescue, 
CJKB. 
38   H J Hanham The Nineteenth Century Constitution, 1815-1914 (1969), 30. 
39  John Cannon and Ralph Griffiths The Oxford Illustrated History of the British 
Monarchy (1988) p 530. 
40  H J Hanham The Nineteenth Century Constitution 1815-1914 (1969) p 25. 
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the sole authoriser of executive action”.41 The democratic mandate is 
important in the legislative process; but it is less clear that it should be 
exercised through Parliament, when we are considering actions of the 
executive. After all, the executive is already totally dependent upon 
parliamentary support, through the principle of ministerial responsibility, and 
the need for parliamentary supply.  
The scope of the royal prerogative has not gone uncontested – indeed its 
history is one of challenge, especially in the seventeenth century.
42
 There has 
been some discussion recently of curtailing or even abolishing, the royal 
prerogative, in the United Kingdom,
43
 in New Zealand, and elsewhere. 
Though it would be incorrect to In the United Kingdom this call has been 
particularly associated with the deployment of troops to foreign theatres of 
war,
44
 though it can scarcely be called a „groundswell‟ of public opinion 
demanding comprehensive replacement of the royal prerogative, as Harris 
could be inferred to suggest is the case.
45
 After initially announcing plans for 
a sweeping reform of the prerogative the Government has decided to 
undertake only a small amount of tidying up work.
46
 A draft Constitutional 
Reform and Governance Bill was published in the United Kingdom in March 
2008, containing provisions for the statutory replacement of a modest 
                                                   
41
  B V Harris “Replacement of the Royal Prerogative in New Zealand” (2009) 23 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 285 at 298. 
42
  The insistence, in the Militia Ordinance of March 1642, that control of the militia 
should be vested in Parliament – a direct assault on the prerogative – was justified 
entirely in neo-Roman terms; Adam Tomkins Our republican constitution (2005), 89; 
Quentin Skinner, “Classical Liberty Renaissance Translation and the English Civil 
War” in Visions of Politics (2002), 326 (see Cicero‟s maxim that salus populi 
suprema lex est [“the safety of the people is the supreme law”]). 
43
  The Labour Government is committed to moving progressively towards 
replacement of the major remaining royal prerogative powers with statutory authority. 
See The Governance of Britain (July 2007) Cm 7170, and The Governance of Britain 
– War Powers and Treaties: Living Executive Powers (October 2007) CP 26/07. The 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democratic Party also favour some reforms: 
David Cameron “Modernisation with a Purpose” speech launching the Democracy 
Task Force, 6th February 2006; For the People, By the People (2007) Policy Paper No 
83, paras 5.8-5.8.3. 
44
  Particularly, according to Harris, the Falkland Islands, Kuwait, Bosnia and 
Afghanistan; B V Harris “Replacement of the Royal Prerogative in New Zealand” 
(2009) 23 New Zealand Universities Law Review 285-314. 
45
  Ibid, at 287. 
46
  The Governance of Britain (July 2007) Cm 7170; Ministry of Justice, “Review of 
the Executive Royal Prerogative: Final Report” (Ministry of Justice, London, 15th 
October 2009). 
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selection of royal prerogative powers.
47
 Other steps may follow in the United 
Kingdom. 
Harris, in a recent article, argues for the eventual replacement of surviving 
royal prerogatives in New Zealand with statutory authority.
48
 His thesis for 
this is comparatively simple. The common law royal prerogative, statute law, 
and the so-called „third source‟ of authority, are the legal bases for executive 
action.
49 However, the royal prerogative doesn‟t meet the standard of an ideal 
model (which he proposes); it is less democratic, less certain, less accessible, 
and less easily understood. This argument, however, involves a paradox; the 
royal prerogative “as currently perceived” falls short of the ideal model; but 
the model itself is a conceptual construct which itself can be subject to 
criticism.  
While a more deliberate conceptual design approach to the provision of 
legal authority for executive action may well be desirable, it has not been 
established that this necessitates a statutory basis (or indeed another basis) for 
authority replacing the royal prerogative. It is true that there may be no 
consistent source for executive powers (though there are only three sources
50
), 
but it is not clear why that should lead to support for the triumph of 
parliamentary supremacy over the supremacy of the law (or indeed of the 
Crown). In the event of the adoption of an entrenched written constitution, in 
either New Zealand or the United Kingdom, the matter might well be 
different, for in that case the source of all authority could ultimately be the 
constitution itself, though it would not necessarily be so – in Australia the 
source is the people, despite what the Constitution appears to say.
51
 
                                                   
47
  The Governance of Britain – Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (March 2008), Cm 
7342-11, and the Report of the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and House of 
Commons on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (31st July 2008), HL Paper 166-I 
HC Paper 551-I. 
48
  B V Harris “Replacement of the Royal Prerogative in New Zealand” (2009) 23 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 285. A few years earlier, in “The 
Constitutional Future of New Zealand” (2004) New Zealand Law Review 269 at 308, 
Harris speculated that if New Zealand were to adopt a written constitution it could 
provide for the royal prerogative “to survive, and be relevant to the new institutions of 
government created under the written constitution”. 
49
  B V Harris “The „Third Source‟ of Authority for Government Action” (1992) 108 
Law Quarterly Review 626; BV Harris “The „Third Source‟ of Authority for 
Government Action Revisited” (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 225. 
50
  Ibid. 
51
  Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 
per Mason CJ. 
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To overly promote and emphasise one branch of government over the 
other is weakening of the separation of powers, for this is not the legislature 
asserting its law-making role; it is the legislature infringing on the role of the 
executive to make and implement policy. Thus, to address one perceived 
weakness in the system in this manner is actually creating a new imbalance. 
The very independence of the royal prerogative from parliamentary control is 
arguably its strength, not a weakness. 
The royal prerogative may not be based on parliamentary mandate, prior or 
subsequent, but that does not mean that it lacks its own legitimacy. Blackstone 
himself observed that one of the strengths of the prerogative: 
 
“was the limitation of the king‟s prerogative by bounds so certain and 
notorious, that it is impossible he should ever exceed them, without 
the consent of the people, on the one hand; or without, on the other, a 
violation of that original contract, which in all states impliedly, and in 
ours most expressly, subsists between the prince and the subject.”52  
 
Legitimacy offers reasons why a given state deserves the allegiance of its 
members, but also why the authority of an institution is respected and 
enforced. Max Weber identified three bases for this authority ─ traditions and 
customs; legal-rational procedures (such as voting); and individual charisma.
53
 
Some combination of these can be found in most political systems. The first is 
more relevant with respect to the Crown, but in some respects the others also 
apply. 
In modern democratic societies popular elections confer legitimacy upon 
governments – though where these processes are disputed legitimacy is 
threatened. But legitimacy can also be independent of the mere assertion of 
authority or the opinion of the claimant. This has been particularly important 
in the late twentieth century discussion of indigenous rights.
54
 Thus rights are 
not dependent or conditional upon public opinion or majoritarian support – 
indeed, such support is often lacking. 
There has been a tendency to undervalue the Crown as a source of 
legitimacy, because its legitimacy is regarded as of minimal significance 
compared with that derived from the ballot box. But, in the view of observers 
such as Smith and Birch, the most important of the defects of the liberal 
political model of the Westminster-type constitution ─ the view of the 
                                                   
52
 Sir William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th edn 1770), Book 
I, Chapter VII, p 237.  
53
  See Randall Collins Weberian Sociological Theory (1986). 
54
  See, for example, Sir Eli Lauterpacht “Sovereignty” (1997) 73(1) International 
Affairs 137. 
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political theorist rather than the lawyer or politician ─ is its failure to depict 
the role of the Crown in the system of government, and the implications of the 
interrelated independence of the executive.
55
 The legitimacy of the Crown is 
dependent on popular support, but is also independent of it. 
The legitimacy of the Crown includes that owed to the established regime. 
With the modern democratic ethos it might be possible to regard legitimacy 
which has such a basis of authority as weak, but it does nevertheless have its 
value. In Tuvalu, for instance, respect for the Crown was regarded as instilling 
a high sense of respect for whoever was occupying the position of Governor-
General, not so much because of the incumbent, but rather for the durability 
of a system which had stood the test of time; the British monarchy.
56
 This was 
particularly so because the country was linked, by the Crown, with a much 
larger, world-wide, political entity. In other words, the institution was greater 
than the individual.  
The Crown itself provides some governmental legitimacy, simply because 
it is a permanent manifestation of authority, a proto-state as some would 
argue.
57
 Smith has suggested that in Canada the Crown provides the necessary 
underlying structure for government. This could be true in New Zealand, 
arguably even more so, since there is no entrenched written constitution upon 
which constitutional or political thought may focus.
58
 Although electoral 
support might suffice for much of the legitimacy of government, this is 
reinforced by the historical continuity of the Crown.   
In contrast to a common political theorists‟ view ─ which concentrates 
upon the political actors
59
 ─ official terminology (the view of the 
administrator) had in the past tended to emphasise the importance of the 
Crown. Thus the formal role the Sovereign plays in Parliament conveys a 
                                                   
55  David E Smith The Invisible Crown (1995); Anthony Birch The British System of 
Government (9th edn, 1993). 
56  Tauassa Taafahi  Governance in the Pacific (1996) p 1. 
57
  Joseph Jacob The Republican Crown: Lawyers and the Making of the State in 
Twentieth Century Britain (1996). 
58
  The Treaty of Waitangi might serve a similar purpose, though it is perhaps unlikely 
that it would achieve this alone, as opinion polls suggest that it lacks the general 
support of the non-Maori population; see Paul Perry, and Alan Webster New Zealand 
Politics at the Turn of the Millennium: Attitudes and Values about Politics and 
Government (1999) pp 74-75.  
59
  Note the emphasis in such works as Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth 
McLeay, Nigel Roberts and Hannah Schmidt “Caretaker Governments and the 
Evolution of Caretaker Conventions in New Zealand” (1998) 28(4) Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 629, where the institutional role of the Crown is 
given relatively little coverage. 
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totally different view to that of the political realist. It is arguably even more 
inaccurate, as the Sovereign‟s legislative role has been largely nominal for 
some three hundred years ─ except with respect to colonial legislatures, and 
even here the role has been exercised on the advice of Ministers.    
According to Barker, the principal function of the theory of the Crown is 
to provide a legal person who can act in the courts, to whom public servants 
may owe and own allegiance, and who may act in all those exercises of 
authority, such as the making of treaties or the declaration of war, which do 
not rest upon the legislative supremacy of Parliament.
60
 They are also the 
legal person who exercises the administrative function of executive 
government. 
In this view, and in the United Kingdom at least, and probably in all the 
realms also, the legitimacy involved here is quite independent of any popular 
authorisation, and the idea of the Crown as a legitimising principle is 
articulated and employed within the personnel and operation of government, 
though little outside.  
Curtailment of the royal prerogative is largely based on its lack of 
legitimacy, but this is overly simplistic, as the royal prerogative possesses a 
different type of legitimacy, distinct from the majoritarian dictatorship found 
in representative parliamentary democracy. It is closer to the legitimacy of the 
judiciary.   
 
JUSTICIABILITY AND OTHER LIMITATIONS ON THE 
PREROGATIVE 
 
Harris, and commentators in the United Kingdom, are concerned with the 
legitimacy of the royal prerogative, but they are also concerned with the 
question of the accountability of the executive for its actions. There is a range 
of ways in which this can be achieved. Each has an important role to play, 
though for most practical purposes the most effective day-to-day control has 
proven to be the courts. 
It was long maintained that the royal prerogative was generally non-
justiciable (or non-reviewable by the Courts),
61
 though it has always been the 
function of the courts to determine its existence.
62
 The more usual view now 
is that the justiciability or non-justiciability depends not upon the nature of the 
                                                   
60  Rodney Barker Political Legitimacy and the State (1990) pp 143-4. 
61  For example, see Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75, 90 per Gibbs ACJ; Chandler v 
Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763; Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co 
Rep 74; 77 ER 1352 (KB). 
62
  Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 per 
Lord Roskill (obiter) (HL). 
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power – as part of the royal prerogative – but upon its subject matter.63 This 
has the potential effect of widened the scope of judicial review, though the 
Courts show deference to those who discharge royal prerogative powers, in 
the expectation that they will exercise such powers fairly, reasonably, and in 
accordance with law.
64
 
In Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers,
65
 the House of Lords, while 
affirming the unreviewability of the Attorney-General‟s decision to refuse to 
give his consent to a relator action, emphasised the political nature of the 
Attorney-General‟s role rather than its origin in the prerogative. The view 
seemed to be taking hold that the reviewability of the exercise of powers 
depended on the nature of the question, and not on the source of the power. 
The reluctance of the courts to review the prerogative gave ground in the mid-
1980s, especially in the seminal Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for the Civil Service
66
 (the GCHQ case). This held that the prerogative power 
was generally though not universally amenable to review, though the political 
ones were not. This provided an explanation of the earlier decisions such as 
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions
67
 and Hanratty v Lord Butler of 
Saffron Walden,
68
 which is consistent with the newly stated view. The cases 
stemming from the depopulation of the Chagos Archipelago
69
 led to the 
House of Lords deciding, in R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
70
 that the exercise of power by 
the executive alone was amenable to judicial review. 
                                                   
63 Ibid; Black v Chretien (2001) 199 DLR (4th) 228 (Court of Appeal of Ontario); 
Minister for Arts, Heritage & Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274, 
277-278 per Bowen CJ, 280 per Sheppard J, 302-304 per Wilcox J; 75 ALR 218 (FC); 
Macrae v Attorney-General of New South Wales (1987) 9 NSWLR 268, 273, 277, 281 
per Kirby P, 308 per Priestley JA (CA); Attorney-General for the United Kingdom v 
Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86 (CA); Century Metals 
& Mining NL v Yeomans (1989) 40 FCR 564, 587-588; 100 ALR 383; 22 ALD 730 
(FC); Blyth District Hospital Inc v South Australian Health Commission (1988) 49 
SASR 501, 509 per King CJ (FC).  
64
  Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672, 683 (CA). 
65
  [1978] AC 435; [1977] 3 All ER 70 (HL). 
66
  Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
(HL). 
67
  [1964] AC 763. 
68
  [1971] 115 Sol Jo 386; The Times, 12th May 1971 (CA) (prerogative of mercy). 
69  See R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61; [2008] 3 WLR 955 (HL); R (Bancoult) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2001) 2 WLR 1219 (HL). 
70  [2008] UKHL 61; [2008] 3 WLR 955 (HL). 
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Although the courts can now review the exercise of the royal prerogative 
in certain instances,
71
 as where there is a legitimate expectation, there is no 
general power of review.
72
 Having said that, in general terms, the exercise of 
royal prerogative powers is subject to judicial review, although there are 
exceptions – including the honours prerogative.73 These limits have been held 
to apply particularly to the exercise of what may be termed the political 
aspects of the royal prerogative. This was important in the context of Black’s 
case.
74
  
Limitations on the prerogative as outlined above may potentially 
undermine both its legitimacy and effectiveness, because it is in danger of 
being severed from its historic origins. But it may also enhance its legitimacy 
in other ways, because it involves the addition of new checks and balances. Its 
effectiveness may also be enhanced, leading us to quite reasonably question 
why it would need to be abolished, and whether such a step might be 
counterproductive.  
In addition, the curtailment or regulation of the prerogative can cause 
unexpected problems. This can be seen illustrated, in a quite technical 
manner, in a recent Irish imbroglio. 
 
THE FATE OF THE PREROGATIVE IN IRELAND 
 
The abolition of the prerogative – or even its codification – can create 
problems which may not be anticipated. The experience in Ireland can 
illustrate this. Once part of the United Kingdom, from the twentieth century 
Ireland reasserted its ancient independence. But this had certain 
consequences, some of which were unforeseen, as a result of the way in which 
independence was achieved, through a series of revolutionary and 
evolutionary steps, from a once-unitary Crown.   
From 1922 the situation became complicated, with the Constitution of the 
Irish Free State remaining silent on the question of the royal prerogative – 
which was clearly not then transferred to the government of the State, but 
which probably preserved the royal prerogative in the hands of the King. It 
seems that the royal prerogative was unaffected by the advent of the Irish Free 
                                                   
71
  Such as when it relates to the honours prerogative; Black v Chretien (2001) 199 
DLR (4th) 228, paras 27 per Laskin JA (Court of Appeal of Ontario). 
72  Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
(HL). 
73
  As was found in Black v Chretien (2001) 199 DLR (4th) 228 (Court of Appeal of 
Ontario). 
74
  Ibid. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 
15 
 
State – at least until 1937 (or rather 1936, as shall be seen), and the effective 
creation of an Irish republic. 
The royal prerogative was not transferred or assigned to the Irish 
government in 1936 or 1937. From 12
th
 December 1936 the King ceased to be 
such for all purposes except signing treaties and accrediting envoys, since 
Irish citizens remained subjects of the Crown. Whilst we must remember that 
the notion of the separation of the Crowns was not fully developed at this 
time,
75
 it does show that the transitional period was one in which clear and 
simple solutions were not always to be obtained.  
The question now becomes, what happened to the royal prerogative in 
Ireland after 1943 (or rather, 1937, which was the year the Constitution of 
Ireland came into force, or 1936, when the Executive Authority (External 
Relations) Act 1936 replaced the King as Sovereign, and retaining the King – 
as an organ – only for certain limited external purposes)?76  
It has been claimed that State inherited the royal prerogative. 
Unfortunately this does not seem to be correct. In the case of Byrne v 
Ireland
77
 the Supreme Court of Ireland categorically established that the Irish 
Republic did not inherit the royal prerogative.
78
 It was apparently excluded – 
indeed this occurred in 1922,
79
 rather than in 1937, or in 1949, when Ireland 
became officially as well as effectively a republic.  
Had the royal prerogative been included in the 1922 constitution, or 
subsequently assigned to the Irish State, it would have transferred to the new 
one in 1937; however it is not clear that it was included. No express provision 
was made for royal prerogatives in the 1922 Constitution.
80
 Certain royal 
prerogatives continued to be exercised by the King until 1936. The royal 
prerogatives were left with the King after 1922, and not incorporated into the 
Constitution.  
The Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 restricted the 
powers of the Crown to signature of treaties and accreditation of envoys. The 
Act itself did more than restrict the powers of the Crown. In an adroitly 
                                                   
75
  Generally, see Noel Cox “The control of advice to the Crown and the development 
of executive independence in New Zealand” (2001) 13(1) Bond Law Review 166. 
76
  Constitution (Amendment No 27) Act 1936 (Eire). 
77
  [1972] IR 241 (Sup Ct (Irl)). 
78
  Supported by Webb v Ireland [1988] IR 353 and Geoghegan v Institute of 
Chartered Accountants [1995] 3 IR 86.  
79
  The Constitution of Saorstát Éireann 1922. 
80
  Kevin Costello “The Expulsion of Prerogative Doctrine from Irish Law: 
Quantifying and Remedying the Loss of the Royal Prerogatives” (1997) 32 Irish 
Jurist 145 at 164. 
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worded section,
81
 it was provided that, from the passage of the Act (12
th
 
December 1936), the King “cease[d] to be King” for “all other (if any) 
purposes”, except for those of s 3(1). The King for the purposes of s 3(1) 
would be the person who would be his successor under the law of the Irish 
State – the Act provided for the abdication of King Edward VIII. Section 3(1) 
does not make the „King‟ King of Ireland, but rather provides that the King of 
Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and South Africa, had certain 
limited and defined responsibilities with respect to Irish foreign relations.  
On December 29
th
 1937 a new Constitution entered into force, which was 
republican in form, if not in name. It made no mention of the King as 
Sovereign, who had effectively been removed as of the precious December by 
the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936. This Act continued in 
force. The King as Sovereign was no longer the head of the Irish executive, 
but merely an organ or instrument, authorised by the Government of Ireland, 
to play a specific role in external affairs. 
Article 49 of the new Constitution provided for the transmission of the 
powers, functions, rights and prerogatives held by the Irish State before 11
th
 
December 1936,
82
 to the Oireachtas. The crucial elements to note are that the 
powers that were transferred under Article 49 were those held by the State at 
that time, and that these powers were transferred to the legislature, not the 
executive. 
Although the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 had 
effectively excised the King as of the 12
th
 December 1936, the new 
Constitution preserved all „prerogatives‟ held by the Irish State as of the 
previous day. The question then becomes this: were the royal prerogatives of 
the King held by the Irish State on 10
th
 December 1936? If they were, then 
they were inherited, under the 1937 Constitution, by the Oireachtas. If they 
were held by the King, as distinct from the State – if that distinction could be 
made – then they were not inherited.  
It would be usual to assume that the powers of the King would be counted 
among the powers of the state. In the 1922 Constitution the King was 
envisaged as being part of the state.
83
 Article 2 stated that “All powers of 
                                                   
81
  Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 (Ireland), s 3(2). 
82
  The Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 (Ireland) provided that 
Edward VIII remained king in the Irish Free State until 12th December 1936. The 
effect of Article 49(1) was that none of the royal prerogatives held by King George VI 
were transferred. There is also an argument in Ireland that since the Irish Free State 
had not been consulted as to the abdication of Edward VIII he remained king of 
Ireland until the office was abolished.  
83
  Though he was, in the 1922 Constitution, part of Parliament: “All powers of 
government and all authority, legislative, executive, and judicial, in Ireland are 
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government and all authority, legislative, executive, and judicial, in Ireland 
are derived from the people of Ireland, and the same shall be exercised in the 
Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) through the organisations established by or 
under, and in accord with, this Constitution”. Article 51 provided that “The 
Executive Authority of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) is hereby 
declared to be vested in the King, and shall be exercisable, in accordance with 
the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the exercise of the 
Executive Authority in the case of the Dominion of Canada, by the 
Representative of the Crown.” Together these would appear to suggest that 
the royal prerogative – which is probably not mentioned in the Constitution 
because it is regarded as being a distinct type of law – would be a „prerogative 
of the state‟. 
The 1937 Constitution stated that “the powers, functions, rights and 
prerogatives held by the Irish State” before 11th December 1936 were 
inherited by the new Constitution. Articles 12 and 51 of the 1922 Constitution 
could be interpreted as embracing the royal prerogative as part of the powers, 
not of the Constitution per se, but of the King as the person in whom was 
vested the Executive Authority of the Irish Free State. However, in 1922 the 
concept of the division of the Crown was not well developed, and it is likely 
that the royal prerogative was not intended to be patriated in this manner. 
Indeed, it would seem that the British Government was opposed to a transfer 
of the office to the control of the Irish Free State because of the concern that 
this would harm the unity of the Crown and the royal prerogative. This 
attitude could only be maintained if the royal prerogative is seen as being 
distinct from the „executive authority‟ of the 1922 Constitution.  
Thus it is not clear whether the royal prerogative was a „prerogative held 
by the Irish State‟, and therefore inherited by that State in 1937. Although it 
might be a conceptually stronger argument to assert that the royal prerogative 
was included in the 1922 Constitution, we are bound by the decisions in Byrne 
v Ireland,
84
 and subsequent cases, that the royal prerogative was not 
transferred to the Irish State.  
The safest conclusion is that the royal prerogative was not transferred to 
the Irish Government in 1922, or subsequently prior to 11
th
 December 1936. 
This illustrates the dangers of ignoring the royal prerogative, because of its 
                                                                                                                         
derived from the people of Ireland, and the same shall be exercised in the Irish Free 
State (Saorstát Eireann) through the organisations established by or under, and in 
accord with, this Constitution” (Article 12). 
84
  [1972] IR 241 (Sup Ct (Irl)). 
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comparatively narrow scope, or even of simply abolishing it – the very 
uncertainty of the prerogative is both a curse and a blessing.
85
 
The Irish experience may be compared and contrasted with that elsewhere. 
It would, in principle, be easy to simply enact that the executive powers of the 
state are vested in the Sovereign – or the President, in the case of a republic. 
This is actually done in most realms. For example, the Belize Act 1981, the 
schedule of which contains the Constitution of Belize, simply provides that: 
 
“The executive authority of Belize is vested in HM.”86 
 
Similarly s 61 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
87
 
provides that: 
 
“The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen 
and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen‟s 
representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of the 
laws of the Commonwealth.”  
 
However, the constitutional provision alone isn‟t a satisfactory basis for 
executive authority, and in all these latter instances the royal prerogative 
remains. This has proven to be of benefit, as in Tuvalu, where the Governor 
General was held to have had discretion to act in “his own, deliberate 
judgement”, despite the stricter wording of the Constitution.88 Abolition of the 
royal prerogative presents some difficulties, both in codifying the law, and 
also in determining precisely what should be covered. Codification, by its 
very nature, presupposes that it is possible to provide a precise list of the 
required powers of the executive.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The replacement of the royal prerogative with statutory authority, whether 
piecemeal or in its entirety, may be justified on that grounds that this would 
allow greater parliamentary control of the executive. Whilst this might appear 
logical from the viewpoint of providing a democratic mandate for 
                                                   
85  This latter is seen most clearly in the national security cases, which rely heavily on 
the malleability of the prerogative. 
86  S 36(1). 
87
  63 & 64 Vict c 12 (UK). 
88
  Amasone v Attorney General (2003) TVHC 4 (Tuvalu); Constitution of Tuvalu 
(1978). See also Billy Hilly v the Governor-General of the Solomon Islands [1994] 
SBCA 1 (CA of Solomon Islands). 
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governmental action, it risks making a significant change to the constitutional 
balance. Ministerial responsibility already allows Parliament to exercise a 
considerable degree of control over the executive, including the use of the 
royal prerogative. But the principle of separation of powers surely requires 
that the executive ought to be free, at least to some degree, to exercise its 
proper functions without undue interference from the other branches of 
government. Already the royal prerogative is largely subject to judicial review 
(for instance, in R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
89
 [the House of Lords saw “no reason 
why prerogative legislation should not be subject to review on ordinary 
principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety in the same way 
as any other executive action”]), and it is only exercised – with rare 
exceptions – on the advice of Ministers responsible to Parliament. Arguably 
the independence of the royal prerogative from parliamentary control is its 
strength, not a weakness.  
Perhaps more fundamentally, the royal prerogative already offers a system 
of legal powers, immunities and privileges with their own legitimacy and 
authority, well developed, flexible and venerable. While some reforms may be 
appropriate, in general the royal prerogative is too valuable to be lost, or 
seriously weakened, merely to confer greater control by majoritarian 
parliamentarians over the executive. Reliance on judicial review of the royal 
prerogative (and its preservation) ensures that there are greater checks and 
balances in the constitution, especially in the United Kingdom, with the 
advent of the new Supreme Court, and in the absence of a written constitution. 
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  [2008] UKHL 61; [2008] 3 WLR 955. 
